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THE WRONG CHOICE TO ADDRESS 
SCHOOL CHOICE: ESPINOZA V. 




For many school-choice advocates, Espinoza v. Montana 
Department of Revenue1 is the chance to extend the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer2 in 
2017.3 In Trinity Lutheran, the Supreme Court held that a state’s 
exclusion of a church from a public benefit program to resurface 
playgrounds discriminated against religion in violation of the Free 
Exercise Clause.4 Many school-choice proponents hope to extend the 
Trinity Lutheran holding from playgrounds materials to school funding 
and thus strike down religion-based exclusions in school voucher 
programs.5 However, Espinoza is the wrong vehicle to do so. In 
Espinoza, the Montana Supreme Court struck down a voucher-type tax 
credit program that provided scholarships, which could be used at any 
private school, as violating the Montana Constitution’s prohibition on 
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 1.  435 P.3d 603, 608–09 (Mont. 2018). 
 2.  137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 (2017).  
 3.  Frank Ravitch, Symposium: Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue: The Battle 
Between May and Must Fund, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 18, 2019, 3:21 PM), https://www.scotus 
blog.com/2019/09/symposium-espinoza-v-montana-department-of-revenue-the-battle-between-
may-fund-and-must-fund/ [hereinafter SCOTUSBLOG on Espinoza]. For the purposes of this 
commentary, school-choice advocates believe that public education funds should follow students 
to the educational institutional of their choice, whether it be public or private. 
 4.  Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2017, 2024. 
 5.  Mark Rienzi, Symposium: The Calm Before the Storm for Religious-Liberty Cases?, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 26, 2019, 10:42 AM) https://www.SCOTUSblog.com/2019/07/symposium-
the-calm-before-the-storm-for-religious-liberty-cases/ (“Applying Trinity Lutheran to funding for 
private education opens the door to forcing states to include religious schools in any program 
open to secular ones, including voucher programs.”). 
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funding religious schools.6 By striking down the program, the state 
court eliminated any alleged discrimination. Therefore, the Supreme 
Court should affirm and decline to extend the non-discrimination 
principles expressed in Trinity Lutheran to the use of funding for 
religious education. If the Court ignores the lack of discrimination, as 
it seems it might,7 it should in the alternative still affirm the Montana 
Supreme Court’s decision as consistent with the Trinity Lutheran line 
of cases and solidify the distinction between discrimination based on 
religious status and religious use. 
I. FACTS 
In 2015, the Montana Legislature enacted a scholarship program 
that gave dollar-for-dollar tax credits of up to $150 annually for 
donations to nonprofit “student scholarship organizations.”8 Under 
this scholarship Tax Credit Program, the scholarship organization used 
these funds to provide tuition scholarships to a “Qualified Education 
Provider” (“QEP”), defined under the statute to include essentially any 
private school in Montana, including religious schools.9 Taxpayers 
cannot direct their funds to go to a specific QEP, and the funds are paid 
directly to the QEP by the student scholarship organization.10 Since the 
program was enacted, only one student scholarship organization was 
formed. Thirteen private schools received funding through that 
organization, twelve of which were religiously affiliated.11 
The Montana Department of Revenue is the agency “responsible 
for implementing and administering” the Tax Credit Program and was 
granted authority to adopt rules necessary to do so.12 The Legislature 
also dictated that the Department of Revenue must comply with 
Article X, Section 613 of the Montana Constitution—commonly known 
 
 6.  Espinoza, 435 P.3d at 614. 
 7.  SCOTUSBLOG on Espinoza, supra note 3. 
 8.  Brief of Respondents at 3, Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 139 S. Ct. 2777 (mem.) 
(No. 18-1195) [hereinafter Brief of Respondents].  
 9.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-30-3102(7) (2015). The relevant part reads: 
“Qualified education provider” means an education provider that: (a) is not a public 
school; (b)(i) is accredited . . . (c) is not a home school . . . (d) administers a nationally 
recognized standardized assessment test or criterion-referenced test  . . . (e) satisfies the 
health and safety requirements prescribed by law for private schools in this state; and 
(f) qualifies for an exemption from compulsory enrollment . . . . 
 10.  Espinoza, 435 P.3d at 606. 
 11.  Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 5.  
 12.  Espinoza, 435 P.3d at 607. 
 13.  MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6. 
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as the “No-Aid Clause”—in administering the program.14 The No-Aid 
Clause was adopted in 1972 when Montana held a Constitutional 
Convention to create a new state constitution.15 The provision prohibits 
the government from making “any direct or indirect appropriation or 
payment from any public fund or monies . . . for any sectarian purpose 
or to aid any church, school, academy, seminary, college, university . . . 
controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or denomination,” 
with an exception for federal funds intended for private schools that 
can be channeled through the state government.16 Thirty-seven other 
states have similar constitutional provisions restricting aid to religious 
schools in varying degrees.17 Soon after the Tax Credit Program was 
enacted, the Department of Revenue implemented Rule 1, which 
provided that religious schools did not qualify as QEPs under the 
program.18 The Department of Revenue justified Rule 1 as being 
necessary to bring the Tax Credit Program into compliance with the 
No-Aid Clause as the scholarship program statute required.19 
Petitioners, parents of children granted scholarships through the 
Tax Credit Program, sued the Department of Revenue and its Director 
to challenge Rule 1 on free exercise grounds.20 A Montana district court 
found for the Petitioners and granted an injunction against Rule 1, 
holding the No-Aid Clause was inapplicable because the tax credits 
were not “appropriation[s]” under the No-Aid Clause.21 The 
Department of Revenue appealed.22 The Tax Credit Program remained 
intact without any limitation on funds going to religious schools as the 
case was being litigated up to the highest court in the state.23 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment,24 incorporated to the states through the Fourteenth 
 
 14.  Espinoza, 435 P.3d at 607. 
 15.  Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 18.  
 16.  MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6. 
 17.  Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 2. Cf. Espinoza, 435 P.3d at 610–11 (observing 
that Montana’s no-aid provision is distinct from those of other states because it contains a stronger 
prohibition against any kind of aid to religious schools). 
 18.  Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 4–5. 
 19.  Id. at 5. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Espinoza, 435 P.3d at 608. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
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Amendment,25 bar the federal and state governments from establishing 
a religion and interfering with the free exercise of religion.26 The 
Establishment Clause constructs “a wall of separation between church 
and state,” barring laws that aid religion or exhibit a preference for one 
religion over others.27 The Free Exercise Clause forbids laws that 
prohibit the free exercise of religion or discriminate against religion, 
including broad bans, indirect coercion, and penalties on religious 
exercise and exclusions from generally available public benefits.28 
The dual commands of the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment embody two longstanding traditions— a commitment to 
“staunch protection of religious freedom” and a “principled opposition 
to government aid to religious institutions”29—whose interests are 
“frequently in tension.”30 Still, between the fundamental prohibitions 
of the Religion Clauses, there is “room for play in the joints” where 
“there are some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause 
but not required by the Free Exercise Clause.”31 
For example, in Locke v. Davey, the Supreme Court upheld a 
Washington state scholarship program that prohibited recipients from 
using funds to receive a devotional theology degree against a free 
exercise challenge.32 The Court found the exclusion for devotional 
theology degrees was justified by the state’s longstanding anti-
establishment interest in not funding the training of religious clergy.33 
The Court stated that there was “no doubt that the State could, 
 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.”). 
 25.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947) (“Prior to 
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment did not apply as a restraint 
against the states.”). 
 26.  See Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (“The general principle 
deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will 
not tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental interference with 
religion.”). 
 27.  See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15–16, holding: 
The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws 
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another . . . No tax 
in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or 
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or 
practice religion. 
 28.  Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 11.  
 29.  Id. at 1.  
 30.  Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004). 
 31.  Id. at 719. 
 32.  Id. at 724. 
 33.  Id. at 723–24. 
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consistent with the Federal Constitution, permit [scholarship 
recipients] to pursue a degree in devotional theology.”34 However, even 
though the Establishment Clause would have permitted the state to 
administer the program without an exception for theology degrees, the 
Free Exercise Clause did not compel the state to do so.35 Washington 
could draw “a more stringent line than that drawn by the United States 
Constitution” and prohibit funding the training of the clergy without 
stepping outside of the “room for play in the joints.”36 
The Supreme Court has held that a law violates the Free Exercise 
Clause when it creates a “prohibition” on religious exercise through an 
outright ban, indirect coercion, or penalties on free exercise.37 For 
example, in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission,38 the Colorado Civil Rights Commission fined cake shop 
owners for refusing to provide a cake for a same-sex couple in violation 
of the state’s antidiscrimination laws.39 The Supreme Court found for 
the cake shop owners, holding the financial penalty constituted a 
prohibition on their free exercise of their religion, thus violating the 
Free Exercise Clause.40 However, laws that simply “make it more 
difficult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to 
coerce individual into acting contrary to their religious beliefs” do not 
constitute an unconstitutional prohibition on religious exercise.41 
Beginning with its decision in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. 
City of Hialeah42 in 1993, the Supreme Court has increasingly 
acknowledged “that nondiscrimination is crucial to religious freedom” 
and has struck down laws that discriminate against religion.43 In this 
line of cases, the Court applies strict scrutiny to laws that restrict free 
 
 34.  Id. at 719. 
 35.  Id.; see Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2017) 
(“[W]e have recognized that there is ‘play in the joints’ between what the Establishment Clause 
permits and the Free Exercise Clause compels.” (quoting Locke, 540 U.S. at 718)); see also 
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603, 608–09 (Mont. 2018) (stating that when a state 
creates greater separation of church and state, it narrows the “room for play” between the 
Religion Clauses).  
 36.  Locke, 540 U.S. at 718, 722. 
 37.  Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 11 (citing Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2022). 
 38.  138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).  
 39.  Id. at 1725–26. 
 40.  Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 11. 
 41.  Id. at 12 (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n., 485 U.S. 439, 450 
(1988)).  
 42.  508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 43.  Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 1; SCOTUSBLOG on Espinoza, supra note 3.   
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exercise when laws are not neutral in their treatment of religion.44 
Hialeah involved city ordinances criminalizing specific forms of animal 
slaughter that were integral to the Santeria religion and loathed by 
other residents of the city.45 The ordinances were challenged under the 
Free Exercise Clause as having a discriminatory purpose despite being 
facially neutral.46 The Court struck down the ordinances, finding that 
laws “that target[] religious conduct for distinctive treatment or 
advance[] legitimate government interests only against conduct with a 
religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases.”47 
Most recently, in Trinity Lutheran, the Supreme Court reiterated 
these principles and expanded the non-discrimination concept to 
public benefits that were denied to religious entities because of their 
religious status.48 In that case, the Trinity Lutheran Church was denied 
a government funding grant to resurface its playground when it was 
otherwise qualified to receive it solely because it was a religious 
institution.49 Thus, the Court applied strict scrutiny and found that the 
state’s interest in maintaining a greater separation of church and state 
was not compelling.50 In a footnote, a plurality of justices explicitly 
clarified that the majority’s holding only applied to playground 
resurfacing and did not address “religious uses of funding.”51 
III. HOLDING 
The Montana Supreme Court struck down the Tax Credit Program 
as indirectly aiding religious schools in violation of the No-Aid Clause 
of Article X, Section 6 of the Montana Constitution.52 To interpret the 
No-Aid Clause, the Montana Supreme Court looked to the Delegates’ 
intent discerned from the text’s plain meaning and “in light of the 
historical and surrounding circumstances under which the [Delegates] 
drafted the Constitution, the nature of the subject matter they faced, 
 
 44. SCOTUSBLOG on Espinoza, supra note 3. 
 45.  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 526–27 (1993).  
 46.  Id. at 528–29. 
 47.  Id. at 546.  
 48.  See SCOTUSBLOG on Espinoza, supra note 3 (“In Trinity Lutheran the court expanded 
the nondiscrimination concept from Lukumi Babalu Aye to situations in which a public benefit 
without religious content – in that case, rubber chips for resurfacing playgrounds – is denied to an 
entity specifically because the entity is religious.”). 
 49.  Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 (2017). 
 50.  Id. at 2024.  
 51.  Id. at 2024 n.3. 
 52.  Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603, 614 (Mont. 2018). 
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and the objective they sought to achieve.”53 The court determined that 
the 1972 Delegates intended to “broadly and strictly prohibit[] aid to 
sectarian schools.”54 The transcripts from the 1972 Montana 
Constitutional Convention illustrate the Delegates’ concerns that it 
would weaken the public school system if funds could be diverted away 
to religious and other private schools.55 The transcripts show that the 
Delegates intended to craft a provision for their state constitution that 
more strictly prohibited aid to religious schools than its federal 
counterpart.56 
Determining that the Legislature provided tuition indirectly to aid 
religious schools, the court found that the Tax Credit Program was 
facially unconstitutional and violated the No-Aid Clause’s 
“constitutional guarantee to all Montanans that their government will 
not use state funds to aid religious schools.”57After striking down the 
Tax Credit Program as unconstitutional, the court continued to address 
the constitutionality of Rule 1 even though “[a]s a result, [it was] 
superfluous.”58 The court found that Rule 1 exceeded the Department 
of Revenue’s rulemaking grant under the statute.59 Under the statute 
that enacted the Tax Credit Program, the Department of Revenue 
could only issue rules consistent with the statute.60 The statute 
contained a broad definition of QEP clearly meant to encompass 
religious schools.61 Therefore, limiting the definition of QEP under 
Rule 1 to exclude religious schools was inconsistent with the statute 
and exceeded the Department of Revenue’s rulemaking powers.62 The 
Department of Revenue could not “transform an unconstitutional 
statute into a constitutional statute with an administrative rule.”63 
IV. PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT 
Petitioners—parents of children who received tuition scholarships 
through the Tax Credit Program to attend a nondenominational 
 
 53.  Id. at 609. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. at 610. 
 56.  See id. (discerning the delegates’ intent from their understanding that the state clause 
prohibited forms of aid that were permissible at the federal level).  
 57.  Id. at 612–14. 
 58.  Id. at 614. 
 59.  Id. at 615. 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
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Christian school—argue that the Montana Supreme Court’s 
application of the No-Aid Clause to exclude religious options in the 
Tax Credit Program is “inherently discriminatory” and violates the 
Free Exercise Clause principles restated in Trinity Lutheran.64 The 
Petitioners argue the state court’s interpretation of the No-Aid Clause 
to prohibit religious options in a neutral student-aid program 
discriminates against the “religious beliefs and religiously motivated 
conduct” of the Petitioners.65 The court’s interpretation also 
discriminates against the religious “status” of the families and the 
schools: families were motivated by their “status” to send their children 
to religious schools, and the schools are barred by their “status” from 
participating in the Tax Credit Program.66 Therefore, because the 
application of the No-Aid Clause in this case discriminates against free 
exercise rights protected by the First Amendment, the Court should 
apply strict scrutiny.67 Petitioners argue the Montana Supreme Court’s 
application of the No-Aid Clause cannot survive strict scrutiny because 
its only justification for discriminating against religious beliefs and 
status—to “achiev[e] greater separation of church and state than is 
already ensured under the Establishment Clause”—is insufficient and 
has been rejected by the Court in Trinity Lutheran and Widmar v. 
Vincent68 as not “compelling.”69 The Petitioners do not ask the Court to 
invalidate the No-Aid Clause, only its application here.70 
Petitioners urge the Court to expand its holding in Trinity Lutheran 
beyond the situation of playground resurfacing materials denied 
because of religious status, and find that the application of the No-Aid 
Clause to strike down the Tax Credit Program also “discriminates 
 
 64.  Brief for Petitioners at 15, Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 139 S. Ct. 2777 (mem.)  
(No. 18-1195) (Sept. 11, 2019) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners]. This commentary will focus only 
on the two parties’ arguments relating to the Free Exercise Clause, as the case is considered to be 
primarily concern free exercise issues. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium: The New Court and 
Religion, SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 26, 2019, 1:33 PM), https://www.SCOTUSblog.com/2019/07/ 
symposium-the-new-court-and-religion/ (stating that Espinoza will give an indication of how the 
newly composed Supreme Court will approach free exercise questions). 
 65.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 64, at 17.   
 66.  See id. at 18–19 (adding that many religious families, namely Catholics, are required by 
Vatican II to send their children to religious schools whenever possible). 
 67.  Id. at 20.  
 68.  454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
 69.  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 64, at 20–21 (stating states have attempted to rely 
on Blaine Amendments to justify religious exclusions but the Supreme Court rejected this 
argument).   
 70.  Id. at 14 (“And while invalidating section 6(1) is not required here, this Court should 
not allow this provision to strike down the scholarship program just because it allows religious 
options.”). 
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against the religious use of student-aid money” in violation of the Free 
Exercise Clause.71 Petitioners would not bind the Court to the 
stipulation in the footnote in Trinity Lutheran that the holding in 
Trinity Lutheran does not address “religious uses of funds.”72 Instead, 
the Petitioners rely on the concurrence of Justices Gorsuch and 
Thomas, stating “discrimination based on religious ‘use’ is just as 
constitutionally offensive” under the Free Exercise Clause “as 
discrimination based on religious ‘status.’”73 Petitioners argue that 
there is not a meaningful distinction between religious status and 
religious use because many devout families send their children to 
religious schools because it is mandated by their religion.74 Therefore, 
denying a benefit based on proposed religious use in effect denies the 
benefit based on religious status.75 
Petitioners also devote specific attention to distinguishing Espinoza 
from Locke, arguing that Locke actually condemns prohibiting all 
religious options in student-aid programs.76 In Locke, the Court upheld 
the devotional theology exclusion in a generally available scholarship 
program.77 Petitioners argue the Court’s holding in Locke was narrow, 
and the result was dependent on the program’s inclusivity and lack of 
hostility towards religion.78 In addition, Petitioners stress that the 
exclusion was justified by the state’s substantial and longstanding 
“interest in not funding the training of clergy,” in contrast with the 
“deeply troubling” purpose of the No-Aid Clause’s prohibition on all 
aid.79 Petitioners contend that the No-Aid Clause is a Blaine 
Amendment, adopted in order to discriminate against Catholics.80 
Blaine Amendments are state constitutional provisions enacted in the 
mid-to-late 1800s to prevent funding for Catholic schools at a time 
 
 71.  Id. at 21.  
 72.  See id. at 22 (“[D]enying that aid because of the religious use to which such families 
would put it is to deny that aid because of their religious status.”); Trinity Lutheran Church of 
Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 n.3 (2017). 
 73.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 64, at 21–22 (citing Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2026 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (emphasis added)).  
 74.  Id. at 22. 
 75.  See id. (“[D]enying [student] aid because of the religious use to which such families 
would put it is to deny that aid because of their religious status.”). 
 76.  Id. at 26. 
 77.  Id. at 23–24. 
 78.  Id. at 24.  
 79.  Id. at 26–27 (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 722 n.5 (2004)). 
 80.  Id. at 27 (noting that the holding in Locke depended on saying there was no animus 
underlying the state’s exclusion); see generally id. at 31–45 (presenting the history of no-aid clauses 
in Montana to argue that the No-Aid Clause is a Blaine Amendment and its application violates 
the Equal Protection Clause).  
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when the public schools often had strong Protestant influences and 
elements.81 At a height of anti-Catholic animus, Representative James 
Blaine led a campaign to amend the Constitution to prohibit school 
funding for any religious sect that ultimately failed.82 However, Blaine 
turned his attention to the states, and successfully helped pass similar 
‘Blaine Amendments’ into numerous state constitutions.83 Petitioners 
argue these Blaine Amendments, rooted in anti-Catholic animus and 
hostility towards religion, “exacerbate[] the Free Exercise” issues 
because the government “may not devise mechanisms, overt or 
disguised, designed to persecute or oppress a religion.”84 
V. RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT 
Respondents, the Montana Department of Revenue and the 
Director of the Department of Revenue, urge the Court to reject 
Petitioners’ claim that No-Aid Clause application violates the Free 
Exercise Clause and uphold the Montana Supreme Court’s decision to 
strike down the Tax Credit Program.85 To prove that the application of 
the No-Aid Clause violated the Free Exercise Clause, Respondents 
argue that Petitioners must show they were prohibited, coerced, or 
penalized from practicing their religion, or that they were denied a 
generally available benefit because of their religious status.86 
Respondents argue Petitioners cannot show a prohibition on their 
religious free exercise because the state court struck down the Tax 
Credit Program for religious and non-religious beneficiaries alike; thus, 
the Petitioners are neither treated differently nor being denied a 
benefit because the benefit does not exist.87 Respondents distinguish 
this case from Trinity Lutheran because there is no benefit being denied 
after the Tax Credit Program was struck down; while in Trinity 
Lutheran, the church was being denied playground-resurfacing 
materials because of its religious status.88 Similarly, without a benefit to 
be denied, there can be no coercion to abandon one’s faith in order to 
receive a benefit.89 By striking down the Tax Credit Program as 
 
 81.  Id. at 31–32. 
 82.  Id. at 34–35.  
 83.  Id. at 35.  
 84.  Id. at 27 (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
547 (1993)).  
 85.  Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 10. 
 86.  Id. at 11. 
 87.  Id. at 12–13.  
 88.  Id. at 14. 
 89.  Id. 
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violating the No-Aid Clause, the Montana Supreme Court ensured that 
religious families would not be discriminated against or punished for 
exercising their religious freedom.90 
Respondents also contest Petitioners’ description of the No-Aid 
Clause as a Blaine Amendment motivated by religious animus.91 
Respondents stress that the “operative document” is not the 1889 no-
aid provision that Petitioners spend considerable time discussing92 but 
the No-Aid Clause debated and enacted by the Delegates of Montana’s 
Constitutional Convention of 1972.93 Respondents argue these 1972 
Delegates were not motivated by religious bigotry, but instead believed 
the No-Aid Clause would protect religious freedom.94 The Delegates 
believed allowing government aid to religious schools would weaken 
both the public school system and religious institutions, as well as 
infringe on the religious freedom of other taxpayers.95 Respondents 
also emphasize that the Montana Supreme Court was not motivated by 
hostility towards religion when it applied the No-Aid Clause in this 
case, but was instead motivated by a desire to ensure religious schools 
would not be penalized based on their religious status.96 
Respondents also argue that the Court’s decision in Locke, both in 
its majority and dissenting opinions, supports the Montana Supreme 
Court’s application of the No-Aid Clause to strike down the Tax Credit 
Program.97 Respondents stress that Locke supports a state’s decision to 
“singl[e] out religious education as the one thing [it] would not fund,” 
including through a constitutional provision.98 Further, the provision 
that was the basis for the exclusion in Locke was aimed at prohibiting 
funding degrees “designed to induce religious faith.”99 Respondents 
argue that drawing a line between higher education and primary and 
secondary education would be arbitrary, as the latter two are also 
 
 90.  Id. at 13. 
 91.  Id. at 41–42. 
 92.  Id. at 18; see generally Brief for Petitioners, supra note 64, at 28–45 (discussing the 1889 
Montana constitutional amendment). 
 93.  Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 18. 
 94.  Id. at 17–18.  
 95.  Id. at 19–21. 
 96.  Id. at 23; see also id. at 23–24 (discussing the argument of Justice Gustafson in her 
concurrence that the court’s decision also protects religious freedom by not “conditioning a 
government benefit on a person’s willingness to violate his religious beliefs by donating money to 
support schools of a different religion”).  
 97.  Id. at 33–35. 
 98.  Id. at 34. 
 99.  Id. (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 716 (2004)).  
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inherently designed to “induce religious faith.”100 Respondents 
highlight that Justice Scalia’s dissent in Locke prescribed the exact path 
taken by the Montana Supreme Court in ensuring that religious 
individuals and institutions are not being denied a generally available 
public benefit.101 When faced with dual concerns over the “conscience 
of its taxpayers and the Federal Free Exercise Clause . . . the State could 
also simply abandon the program altogether.”102 Cutting further against 
Petitioners’ argument, Respondents stress Scalia’s statement that 
striking down the entire program would be permissible even if it were 
to prevent the funding of religion.103 
Respondents present three other arguments supporting the 
constitutionality of the No-Aid Clause itself and its application to the 
Tax Credit Program.104 First, Respondents argue that the issue of 
taxpayer support for religious institutions was left to the people in the 
First Amendment, and highlight that James Madison, the architect of 
the Free Exercise Clause, had a “principled opposition to state funding 
of religious institutions.”105 Second, Respondents urge the Court to 
defer to the strong national tradition of state constitutional provisions 
that prohibit funding religious schools.106 Finally, Respondents argue 
that accepting Petitioners’ position would be inconsistent with the 
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which has sustained the 
states’ ability “to decide whether to enact school-choice programs that 
support religious schools.”107 Respondents contend this discretion 
should also include the ability to decide not to enact such programs 
through a prohibition at the constitutional level.108 
VI. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court should uphold the Montana Supreme Court’s 
application of the No-Aid Clause to invalidate the Tax Credit Program. 
 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  See id. at 35 (stating the dissent took the stance in Locke that a benefit was being denied). 
 102.  Id. at 36 (quoting Locke, 540 U.S. at 726–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  See id. at 8–9, 12 (noting that Petitioner’s argument is framed as a challenge to the No-
Aid Clause itself regardless of the fact that schools are not being excluded from a benefit program 
because no program exists that they could be excluded from).  
 105.  Id. at 28–29.  
 106.  See id. at 40–44 (“There is an unquestionably longstanding tradition of no-aid clauses . . . 
. [T]he tradition, should, in and of itself, support the constitutionality of no-aid clauses . . . . This 
Court regularly applies this methodology in Establishment Clause cases.”). 
 107.  Id. at 9. 
 108.  Id. at 46–47.  
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The outcome of this case, as exhibited by both of the parties’ briefs, 
hinges heavily on the Court’s interpretation of two cases: Trinity 
Lutheran and Locke.109 Both cases involved religion-based exclusions 
from a public benefit program.110 However, the Court should conclude 
its analysis quickly and focus on the key feature distinguishing 
Espinoza from Locke and Trinity Lutheran: there is no public benefit 
from which Petitioners can be excluded.111 Petitioners’ free exercise 
challenge must fail because they cannot show any “prohibition” of their 
religious free exercise or any discrimination based on their religious 
beliefs, conduct, or status.112 Petitioners are in the exact same position 
as if the Tax Credit Program had never been enacted or had come to its 
natural end.113 Most importantly, by striking down the Tax Credit 
Program, Petitioners are in the exact same position as all other 
Montanans.114 
The same “play in the joints” theory applies to Montana’s No-Aid 
Clause as was the case when the Locke Court held that states are able 
to take action that the Establishment Clause permits but the Free 
Exercise Clause does not require.115 Petitioners are careful throughout 
their brief to argue only the discriminatory application of the No-Aid 
Clause was unconstitutional, not the No-Aid Clause itself.116 
Potentially, Petitioners stop short of making this claim in recognition of 
the strong national tradition of state constitutional provisions that 
exclude religious institutions from receiving school funding.117 
However, Petitioners’ argument would in effect invalidate the No-Aid 
Clause, stripping it of its ability to achieve its primary purpose. This 
interpretation is inconsistent with the Court’s position that not only 
 
 109.  See generally Brief for Petitioners, supra note 64 (dedicating considerable individual 
attention to both Trinity Lutheran and Locke); Brief of Respondents, supra note 8 (same). 
 110.  See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2025 (2017) (finding 
the exclusion of Trinity Lutheran Church from a public benefit to be a violation of the Free 
Exercise Clause); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) (rejecting free exercise challenge to 
the exclusion of devotional degrees from a generally available scholarship program). 
 111.  See Brief of Respondents, supra note 6, at 16 (stating the Court’s holding in Trinity 
Lutheran presupposes a benefit program exists and is excluding religious institutions).  
 112.  Id. at 14. 
 113.  Id.  
 114.  Id. at 13. 
 115.  Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603, 608 (Mont. 2018) (quoting Walz v. 
Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)). 
 116.  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 64, at 14 (“And while invalidating section 6(1) is not 
required here, this Court should not allow this provision to strike down the scholarship program 
just because it allows religious options.”). 
 117.  See Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 40–41 (“Petitioners do not dispute the 
longstanding and widespread nature of no-aid clauses.”). 
RECZKA FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2020  9:31 AM 
250 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 15 
does “room for play in the joints” exist, but also that funding 
restrictions for religious education is a form of approved play.118 
If the Court declines to resolve the case by focusing on the lack of 
discrimination, the Court should, in the alternative, affirm the Montana 
Supreme Court’s decision below as consistent with Locke and Trinity 
Lutheran. In Trinity Lutheran, the Court distinguished its facts from 
those in Locke.119 The Court stated that in Trinity Lutheran the church 
was denied a public benefit of playground resurfacing materials 
because of its status as a religious institution.120 In contrast, the student 
in Locke was not denied scholarship funds because of his status as a 
religious individual, but instead because of what he was going to use 
those funds for: train for the ministry.121 Trinity Lutheran and Locke 
both involve a religion-based exclusion from a public benefit program, 
but the different outcomes the Court reaches are internally consistent 
when viewed in light of the status/use paradigm. Some current Supreme 
Court Justices, and surely the Petitioners, do not view this distinction as 
meaningful.122 However, the status/use distinction helps evaluate the 
free exercise issues at play by stressing the implications of the choices 
created by exclusions based on religious status versus religious use. In 
situations like Trinity Lutheran, the choice for the church is to forgo the 
benefit or deny its status as a church.123 This is a prohibition on the 
church’s free exercise rights; the church is coerced to not exercise its 
religious freedom if it wants to receive the benefit.124 In contrast, in 
situations like Locke, even if the student said that he was not religious 
but wanted to use the scholarship funds to study devotional theology 
anyway, he would still be denied the benefit.125 The student in Locke is 
not presented with the same coercive choice of being denied a benefit 
unless he abandons his religious beliefs. 
 
 118.  See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718, 725 (2004) (“If any room exists between the two 
Religion Clauses,” it is that States have a substantial interest “in not funding the pursuit of 
devotional degrees . . . .”).  
 119.  Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2023–24 (2017). 
 120.  Id.  
 121.  Id.  
 122.  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 64, at 17 (arguing prohibiting the use of public funds 
at religious schools is discrimination based on religious status); Mark Rienzi, supra note 5 
(“Kavanaugh [joined by Alito and Gorsuch] wrote the exclusion of religious organizations from 
equal participation in a government program ‘simply because they are religious’ is ‘pure 
discrimination against religion.’”). 
 123.  Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2023. 
 124.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 64, at 17.  
 125.  See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720–21 (2004) (noting that religion is irrelevant as 
“the State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction,” for all people). 
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Here, Petitioners were not denied a benefit because of their 
religious status. Instead, like the student in Locke, they were denied the 
benefit because of their proposed use for the scholarship funds: 
religious education. Laws that “make it more difficult to practice 
certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into 
acting contrary to their religious beliefs” do not run afoul of the Free 
Exercise Clause.126 Even though Petitioners’ religious beliefs helped 
motivate their choice to send their children to religious schools, they 
are not forced to act contrary to those beliefs.127 Like Washington in 
Locke, Montana had “merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of 
instruction”128 As the Court stated in Locke, “religious instruction is of 
a different ilk,” and there is a long history of states treating the funding 
of religious education differently that dates back to the founding.129 The 
Trinity Lutheran Court’s discussion of Locke, as well as its stipulation 
in a footnote about the holding not reaching the situation of religious 
funding, support this understanding.130 The Court should heed the 
footnote in Trinity Lutheran and decline to extend its non-
discrimination concept in free exercise cases to situations of the 
religious use of funding like Espinoza. 
Nevertheless, if the newly composed Supreme Court is seeking to 
extend its non-discrimination free exercise principles into the context 
of student-aid funding,131 Espinoza is the wrong vehicle to do so for two 
reasons. First, as has already been discussed, Petitioners are not being 
discriminated against or treated any differently than any other 
Montana resident; no benefit program exists from which they are being 
excluded.132 Second, contrary to Petitioners’ straw man argument about 
the “deeply troubling” motives underlying the Court’s application of 
the No-Aid Clause, the No-Aid Clause is not a Blaine Amendment 
 
 126.  Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 12 (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass’n., 485 U.S. 439, 450 (1988)). 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Locke, 540 U.S. at 721. 
 129.  Id. at 721–23. 
 130.  See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2023, 2024 n.3 
(2017) (“This case involves express discrimination based on religious identify with respect to 
playground resurfacing. We do not address religious uses of funding or other forms of 
discrimination.”). 
 131.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium: The New Court and Religion, SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 
26, 2019, 1:33 PM), https://www.SCOTUSblog.com/2019/07/symposium-the-new-court-and-
religion/ (anticipating major changes in free exercise clause jurisprudence in the coming years in 
the direction of robust protection for religion). 
 132.  See Brief of Respondents, supra note 8, at 16. 
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rooted in religious animus.133 The operative No-Aid Clause was passed 
in 1972, with an awareness of the previous constitution’s problematic 
history, and was motivated instead by a desire to protect religious 
freedom.134 Espinoza does not present the opportunity to address the 
constitutionality of Blaine Amendments, and any discussion of the No-
Aid Clause in those terms is misplaced.135 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should uphold the Montana Supreme Court’s 
application of its No-Aid Clause to strike down the Tax Credit 
Program. While the newly composed Court may be seeking an 
opportunity to expand its free exercise non-discrimination principles 
into the school-funding context,136 the Court should refrain from doing 
so not only because Espinoza would be the wrong vehicle for such an 
argument, but also because this expansion is inconsistent with the 
Court’s decisions in Locke and Trinity Lutheran.137 The Court should 
focus on the lack of discrimination present in this case and affirm the 
decision of the Montana Supreme Court. 
In the alternative, the Court should solidify the meaningful 
paradigm distinguishing between laws that discriminate based on 
religious status and laws that discriminate based on religious use that it 
used in Locke and Trinity Lutheran, and uphold Montana’s decision to 




 133.  Id. at 17–18.  
 134.  Id. 
 135.  But see Mark Rienzi, Symposium: The Calm Before the Storm for Religious-Liberty 
Cases?, SCOTUSblog (Jul. 26, 2019, 10:42 AM) https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/07/ symposium-
the-calm-before-the-storm-for-religious-liberty-cases/ (stating the Court should use Espinoza to 
“clarify that state constitutional Blaine Amendments that exclude religious groups from equal 
participation in government benefits are impermissible”).  
 136.  See SCOTUSBLOG on Espinoza, supra note 3 (stating even though Montana’s holding 
is consistent with Trinity Lutheran, the Court will likely apply the nondiscrimination concept to 
the religious education situation).  
 137.  See generally Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 
(2017) (contrasting with Locke by stressing that the student was denied a scholarship because of 
what he proposed “to do,” not because of “who he was”).  
